THE
SANTA BARBARA INDEPENDENT
May
4, 2006
In Search of a Homeland
Kevin
McKiernan Discusses the Future of the Kurds
by
Sam Kornell
They are a Middle Eastern people, 30
million strong, who share a common language and culture.
They have been without a State for thousands of years,
and have been at various times conquered, ruled, and
persecuted by their more powerful neighbors. They are
secular, democratic, and they share a particular affinity
for the United States. They have been routinely denied
their right to self-determination by hostile nations
on all sides.
They are not the Israeli Jews, but the Kurds —
a secular strain of Sunni Muslims who have for at least
2,000 years inhabited a mountainous, oil-rich ellipse
of land that intersects the borders of modern-day Iran,
Iraq, Turkey, and Syria. They have never had a country
of their own, although they are a distinct ethno-linguistic
group with a history in the Middle East that stretches
back to ancient Mesopotamia. As the Santa Barbara-based
journalist Kevin McKiernan notes in his new book The
Kurds: A People in Search of Their Homeland, they
are today the largest ethnic group in the world without
their own state.
McKiernan, a longtime Santa Barbara resident, has spent
the better part of the past 15 years traveling among
the Kurds and reporting on their condition. He first
became acquainted with their story in 1991, when he
covered the Gulf War for ABC News. Since then he has
journeyed extensively through the Kurdistan region,
producing articles and photographs documenting the Kurds
for publications around the country, as well as an award-winning
documentary, Good Kurds, Bad Kurds.
With the publication of his new
book, McKiernan provides valuable new insight into the
Kurds at a time when they are emerging onto the international
stage as a vitally important geo-political player. For
the first time since World War I, when the region known
as Kurdistan was parceled out to Iraq, Iran, and Turkey,
the Kurds are tantalizingly close to realizing their
historical dream of national self-determination. As
Iraq teeters on the brink of civil war — a conflagration,
McKiernan warns, that could ensnare the neighboring
nations of Jordan, Turkey, Iran, Syria, and Saudi Arabia
— the possibility of an independent Kurdistan
being carved from northern Iraq seems ever more likely.
Will that happen? And if so, at what cost? Recently,
I spoke with McKiernan about these and other Middle
East issues from his spacious office on upper State
Street.
Can you give me a snapshot of the Kurds today?
There are between
25 and 30 million Kurds in the Middle East. Politically,
there never really was a country called Kurdistan. Nationalists
today will talk about “reclaiming” a Kurdish
homeland, but that’s inaccurate; there never was
a homeland. A lot of people — when they think
of the Kurds —think of Iraq, because of all the
attention brought by the war in Iraq. But in terms of
population, Turkey has 15 million Kurds, Iran has seven
or eight million, and Iraq a little more than four million.
Syria has 300,000 or so. The 800-pound gorilla, really,
is in Turkey. And that’s why it’s so significant
that in the last week, 16 civilian protesters were killed
in Turkey, demonstrating for the kind of autonomy and
civil rights they see in Iraq. The Kurds in Iraq very
much wanted this war, and have so far profited from
it politically; Kurds in these other countries would
like the same for themselves, and that is a problem
for their respective countries, where they’re
seen as a threat.
Given the opposition from Turkey, Syria, and Iran, do
you think a fully independent Kurdistan in Iraq is possible
in the near future?
In the near future, no. I think it would be
suicide for the Kurds to declare independence. Massoud
Barzani, the president of the Kurdish region, has said
they will declare independence if there’s full-scale
civil war, and they would adopt the doctrine of self-survival.
[The Kurds] would pull the drawbridges up into the castle
and go into a bunker mentality. But Turkey has already
indicated that it would intervene if this happens.
What kind of intervention are we talking about?
Turkey recently moved a large number of soldiers
to the Iraqi border; they now have [roughly] 50,000
troops on the border. Turkey is increasingly angry about
what’s going on — there have been a number
of bombings in Turkey, and not just in the Kurdish areas
but in Ankara and Istanbul as well. A couple of people
have been killed and several dozen injured — a
clear attempt by a PKK (the Kurdistan Workers’
Party) splinter group to damage the coming tourist season
in Turkey. … So, they’re angry. This is
coupled with the fact that there is more anti-American
sentiment in Turkey now than ever, and there’s
rising anti-Semitism, too. One of the bestselling books
in Turkey now is Mein Kampf … Throw into the mix
the dispute [regarding] oil-rich Kirkuk, where there
are Turkmen, and where Turkey believes the Kurds are
abusing the Turkmen and the Arabs, and you’ve
got an explosive situation. I don’t know what
it would take for Turkey to invade, but it’s serious
enough that Iraqi President [Jalal] Talabani —
who is a Kurd — noted the other day that there’s
been a lot of border activity with Iran and Turkey,
and he reminded both countries very pointedly that Iraq
is a sovereign nation.
The U.S. has a longstanding strategic alliance with
Turkey, while Iraqi Kurdistan is a secular democracy
success story. Would the White House allow Turkey to
invade?
If the Kurds unilaterally declared their independence,
against the wishes of the United States, I would be
surprised if the U.S. prevented Turkey from invading.
On the other hand, I think if things get so bad with
the civil war in the south that, in terms of self-preservation,
the Kurds have no choice but to declare independence
from the rest of the country — if that happened,
[Turkey’s wishes] may be regarded in a different
light.
How do the Kurds see the situation?
The interesting thing in all of this is that
the U.S. and the Kurds are friends. The Kurds would
very much like to have a similar situation to Israel’s
in the Middle East. They would like to continue as a
close American ally. … In Iraqi Kurdistan, there’s
a disconnect between what the Kurdish government says
publicly and what the rank-and-file Kurds say. The rank-and-file
Kurds say, “We want total separation, total independence
— Kurds and Arabs are oil and water, we hate the
theocracy of the Shiite-controlled government, and we
don’t want any part of it.” Meanwhile, the
Kurdish leaders, including Talabani, mouth political
platitudes. “We are Iraqis first and Kurds second,”
they say. So, there’s a tug-of-war between those
two realities.
You’ve said the Kurds view oil-rich Kirkuk as
their Jerusalem. How will that issue be resolved?
Kirkuk is such a flashpoint — it’s
the real potential for civil war in the north. Barzani
has said very directly: “We will go to war over
Kirkuk. We will accept nothing less than complete control
of the city.” If the Kurds have exclusive control
of the city, without some sort of multinational solution
there, or where there is a divided city like Jerusalem
— if there isn’t some plan for that, Turkey
has already said it will intervene. So, Kirkuk is the
red line.
The L.A. Times and Human Rights Watch reported
that despite being a bastion of secularity, Iraqi Kurdistan
is not open to divergent political movements.
Well, no … There are two opposing political factions
in Iraqi Kurdistan, and they both operate as a single-party
system in their own territory. And both are intolerant
of dissent.
Will that improve?
It’s the old thing about the trains running
on time in Italy. Some people liked it very much that
[under Mussolini] things were so orderly. I’m
not suggesting that Iraqi Kurdistan is a fascist state
by any means, but there are always tradeoffs for stability.
The question in any democracy is where do you cross
the line, when is stability too costly?
Is an independent Kurdistan on Iraqi soil desirable
for the rest of Iraq?
Iraq has turned out to be a black hole that
gets worse and worse, more dangerous and more dangerous.
And the American policy objective continues to fail.
So, what’s left but the three-state solution?
The Kurds, Sunnis, and Shia — these peoples, and
their territories, were stitched together by British
imperialists in the 1920s. Iraq was a fabricated country
put together for the geo-political interests of Westerners.
So, considering what a failure the effort has been to
unify Iraq, which now seems to be going the way of the
former Yugoslavia, why not have a three-state solution?
If a full-scale civil war does break out, Saudi
Arabia will become involved, as will Jordan, Iran, and
Turkey. There will be dire consequences for American
policy, and the whole balance of the region will change.
That’s what we’re flirting with. So given
that that’s becoming more and more likely each
day, why not do something proactive like talk about
a regional solution?
A big problem with a three-state solution in Iraq seems
to be that the Shiites and the Kurds both have access
to natural resources — namely oil — that
the Sunnis of central Iraq don’t. Right.
In the center of Iraq there is natural gas, but there’s
not enough water and there’s not enough oil. There’s
a lot of natural gas around Baghdad. So in any regional
solution, attention would have to be paid to sharing
those resources somehow.
Are you suggesting a loose federation, with some sort
of apparatus for revenue sharing, while each government
is relatively autonomous?
Well, the big thing they’re fighting about now
is control of security. In the last month the Kurdish-Shiite
alliance was broken, and now there’s a budding
Kurdish-Sunni alliance. The Sunnis say, “We want
to control the ministry of the interior.” That’s
the key demand. The ministry of the interior [in Iraq]
is the FBI, the internal security apparatus, and the
Sunnis want to control that; they want to root out these
Shiite death squads, these uniformed police officers
leaving dozens of handcuffed people shot in the head
when the sun comes up. The other question is, who will
be minister of the army? That’s important because
now the loyalties are based only on ethnic loyalties.
The Shia have 60 battalions, the Sunnis have 45 battalions,
while the Kurds have nine. In the event of all-out civil
war, the loyalty is not to central Baghdad, not to a
federal system — the loyalty of those battalions
is to their respective groups. And in the event of an
all-out civil war, those nine Kurdish battalions are
going to be rushing to Kirkuk to secure the oil fields.
They don’t think in terms of national unity. They
are tribal.
So in other words, a loose federation might be problematic,
but a unified Iraq could be worse?
What we’re seeing right now is de facto partition.
The groups are separated, and we’re pretending
they’re not. We keep saying there’s a chance
for a unified government. British imperialists put the
Sunni, the Shia, and the Kurds together some 90 years
ago and made them live together. A series of repressive
governments acted as the glue. Now suddenly the glue
is gone, and we’re trying to say that democracy
is enough for everybody to stick together. And clearly,
it isn’t. Each of these groups is
tribal — they don’t identify with this artificial,
abstract notion of a central Baghdad and a unified Iraq.
And when the shit goes down, they are going to go back
home to the tribes.
How are the Iraqi Kurds faring currently?
The Kurds have it pretty well right now because
of the dreadful failure of American policy, and the
chaos that has ensued in most of Iraq. The Kurds are
up there in the north polishing this little [secular
democracy] experiment they’ve got going, which
they have a 12-year head start on. In other areas, people
are talking about the mosque that got blown up and that
their electricity doesn’t work: “It’s
120 degrees and the air conditioning won’t come
on. We don’t have jobs, and we don’t want
to work for the police because we’ll get killed.”
And on, and on. In the Kurdish areas they’re talking
about new laws for seatbelts, and wondering, “How
come we only have one cappuccino machine in this building?”
It’s a vastly different scene. No American soldiers
have been killed in the north. There have been a few
instances of bombing, but very, very few by comparison
to the rest of the country. Iraqi Kurdistan is a relatively
stable area, it’s able to protect itself, and
so far Uncle Sam won’t permit interference by
Iran and Turkey. If that changes, then everything is
up for grabs.
You first went to Kurdish territory in ’91.
How do things compare now?
The first Kurdish home I slept in was a tent
in the mountains. The water was dirty and I was taking
iodine tablets to quench my thirst. People had very
little food. They were up against the wall, they were
running from Saddam, and at one point the Kurds were
dying at a rate of 1,000 per day. They were blown up
in landmines, they were succumbing to typhoid, and there
was unspeakable agony. That was 1991. Now it’s
2006, and there’s a Kurd who’s president
of Iraq. In 15 years, the Kurds have gone from hiding
in mountains to walking the corridors of power in the
Green Zone [in Baghdad]. That’s a big, big change.
They’ve become a household story in the West.
The gassing of the Kurds in 1988 has become a [retroactive]
justification for this war; a terrible catastrophe was
taken out of cold storage when a use was found for it
15 years later. And suddenly the Kurds are an above-the-fold
story. So, it’s been a wonderful success story
for the Kurds, but I think there’s a lot of bloodletting
ahead. But if you were to freeze the frame right now,
I think the Kurds of Iraq have made magnificent strides,
and they are very happy, while the Kurds in Turkey and
Iran are very happy for the Kurds of Iraq, and they’d
like a little piece of that good luck themselves.
Kevin McKiernan discusses The Kurds: A People in Search
of Their Homeland, on Tuesday, May 9, 8 p.m., at UCSB’s
Campbell Hall. Tickets are $10 general, $8 UCSB students.
Call 893-3535.
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